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A B S T R A C T 
This paper examines the cognitive use of prior knowledge in design and evaluates the 
role of types and precedents in architectural design and education from a cognitive 
perspective. Previous research on design cognition shows that the amount of prior 
knowledge possessed by the designer plays a fundamental role in the production and 
quality of the creative outcome. Prior knowledge is thought to be held by way of 
specific cognitive structures that are called cognitive schemas and, the role of our 
cognitive schemas (be it personal or cultural schemas) is portrayed as indispensable 
for the formation of our creative productions. Although significant efforts were made 
in the way of studying the use of prior knowledge in design, the correlation of types 
and cultural schemas has yet to be explored. This paper examines this correlation 
between cultural schemas, a markedly cognitive concept, and types, an architectural 
one, culminating in an investigation of the cognitive role of types and precedents 
within architectural design and education in the light of the cognitive literature. 
Building on that attempt, the study endeavors to conduct an interdisciplinary 
theoretical inquiry that respectively studies the role of prior knowledge in design 
cognition, the concept of cognitive-cultural schemas, the concept of type and its 
relationship with cultural schemas, and finally, the cognitive role of types and 
precedents in architectural design and education. In conclusion, this study proposes 
that, in terms of function, types are virtually identical to cultural schemas at the 
cognitive level, and types and precedents have a generative value for architectural 
design, by virtue of the fact that they exist as the initial cognitive schemas that are 
employed at the beginning of the design process. 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical research on the cognitive properties 
of design has revealed a number of significant 
characteristics of the creative design process 
so far. One of such characteristics is about the 
nature of design problems. Design problems 
are portrayed as ‘ill-defined’ due to the fact 
that they often lack a clear definition, as their 
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initial conditions, operations and goals are, at 
best, loosely defined and exposed to 
redefinition continuously.  Design tasks in 
general, be it engineering problems or space 
planning tasks in architecture, are often 
reckoned as ill-defined due to these 
characteristics. The ill-defined design problems 
are shown to lack certain characteristics of 
well-defined problems, such as a well-
specified language for their representation, 
the initial knowledge of the generative 
manipulations to be applied on them, and a 
clear formulation of the goal state. These 
factors are found to be defined by their 
solvers, in other words, the designers (Cross, 
2001, p. 3). 
Research has revealed that unlike the ordinary 
problem solvers, the designers approach to ill-
defined design problems with a solution-
focused mindset, by means of constructing a 
problem ‘frame’ to demarcate the limits of 
the problem, propose a solution conjecture 
for it, and understand the problem through 
this solution (Cross, 2001, p. 3). Other than 
searching for the optimal solution, as would a 
problem solver handling a well-defined 
problem, designers are compelled to 
conceive a satisfactory solution for solving the 
ill-defined design problem. Doing so, the 
designers look for a match between the 
problem and the solution, and perceive and 
decipher the problem through these solution 
perspectives. In order to get a working match 
in this problem-solution pair, the designers are 
found to employ primarily their prior 
knowledge. As Nigel Cross (2006) explains it, 
creative design does not always occur in this 
sense as the proposition of an unanticipated 
and unusual proposal, but often as the 
making of a suitable proposal, which contains 
novel features for a new design product. It is 
believed on this basis that creative design 
takes place via a ‘creative leap’ from the 
design constraints to the solution proposal, 
which is supported by the prior knowledge of 
designers (Cross, 2006, p. 3, 44). 
 
2. Cognitive Use of Prior Knowledge in 
Architectural Design 
As indicated above, the solution-oriented 
mindset underlying design, builds essentially 
on the prior knowledge of designers. 
Described as “a particular structured 
formulation of underlying types such as 
concepts, prototypes and precedents”, prior 
knowledge is widely recognized as an intrinsic 
element of any creative design process 
(Oxman, 1999, pp. 17-28). As McDermott 
(1982) put it, given the understanding that 
design is an ill-structured activity, and that the 
set of constraints applicable to specific design 
problems is often substantial, one can hope to 
surmount these problems only when significant 
volumes of domain specific knowledge can 
be combined and fused together at every 
stage of the problem solving process (p. 36). In 
this context, ill-defined design problems 
necessitate nothing but a large base of 
appropriate prior knowledge for the formation 
of their solutions. 
As Jansson, Condoor & Brock (1992) study 
shows, at the early phase of design, namely 
the representation of the problem, the prior 
knowledge of designers, in the form of 
prototypes, types, or precedents, serves as a 
cognitive point of reference to start the design 
process. At the start of the design process, the 
designers are considered to analyze existing 
systems looking for analogies. They then 
proceed to bring up a first solution concept 
that acts as the starting point from which to 
tackle the design problem they face with. In 
this process, the designer focuses on the 
smaller parts of the wider problem, by means 
of sub problems, using a retrieval system that 
continuously recalls prior knowledge from 
his/her long-term memory. Since ill-defined 
design problems require substantial amounts 
of relevant prior knowledge, the retrieval 
system employed on them operates as a 
device to recognize the solution alternatives. 
As the design problems are downsized to a 
series of sub problems as such, these smaller 
parts can be handled better as well-defined 
problems (Fig. 1) (Simon, 1973, pp. 181-201). 
Likewise, Bonnardel and Marmeche (2005) 
suggest that the designer’s past experiences, 
which are stored in terms of his/her prior 
knowledge, are often the sources of 
inspiration in the formation of new ideas (pp. 
422-435). In this sense “designers 
accommodate the known to the new” and 
thus develop the new ideas through 
integration with “what they already know” 
(Oxman, 1990, p. 23). To Oxman (1990b), 
design occurs in this sense as “a dynamic 
process of adaptation and transformation of 
the knowledge of prior experiences in order to 
accommodate them to the contingencies of 
the present” (1990b, pp. 17-28). 
In this context creativity in design occurs as 
“the sudden interlocking of two previously 
unrelated, skills or matrices of thought” 
(Koestler, 1964, p. 121), and emerges as a 
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cognitive process entailing the “activation 
and recombination of previous knowledge 
elements in a new way in order to generate 
new properties based on the previous ones” 
(Bonnardel & Marmache, 2005, pp. 422-435). 
Thus, the studies on design creativity show that 
people depend mostly on past experiences, 
types and precedents, even when they are 
instructed to be as original and imaginative as 
possible. In this perspective, the new ideas 
that are developed are deemed creative 
and original to the extent that they move 
away from their initial sources of inspiration 
(Bonnardel & Marmache, 2005, p. 422-435). 
To quote from Suwa, Purcell & Gero (1998), 
design can be seen on this basis as “a kind of 
apprenticeship in which skills and expertise are 
acquired after learning basic techniques, 
assimilating domain specific and general 
knowledge, and inspecting past good 
examples” (p. 455). Today, it is widely 
accepted that the design ability grows in 
parallel with the extent of the acquired 
domain knowledge and the problem solution 
strategies that are operated on that 
knowledge. The obvious implication of this 
information is that, if designers or students of 
design are provided with ever growing 
databases consisting inter- or intra-disciplinary 
sources, their success in producing creative 
designs would only increase (Bonnardel & 
Marmache, 2005, pp. 422-435). They would be 
expected to produce better outcomes with 
the provision of mental cues given in the form 
of previous designs that show them the use of 
design elements and how they can be 
combined in individual settings (Malhotraa, 
Thomas, Carroll & Millera, 1980, pp. 119-140). 
 
 
Figure 1. A model for ill-structured problems (Simon, 1973). 
 
2.1. Types of Prior Knowledge 
According to the literature, there are 
essentially two types of prior knowledge that 
are employed in design: the declarative (or 
the domain-specific) knowledge, and the 
procedural knowledge (Goel, 2001). 
Declarative knowledge refers to the general 
knowledge about the ‘things’ that we learn 
within our lifetime and it essentially consists of 
the ‘facts’ that we know. Procedural 
knowledge, on the other hand, involves the 
procedures used for the processing of the 
declarative (or the domain-specific) 
knowledge (Goel, 2001, pp. 221-241). In the 
context of performing a given task, the 
declarative knowledge is often believed to go 
through a transformation into a procedural 
form (Chan, 1990, p. 62). As Purcell and Gero 
(1991) put it, these types of prior knowledge 
are acquired by means of either exposure to 
incidental experiences, which characterize 
everyday life, or as a result of intentional 
learning, in which domain-specific 
experiences and the strategies employed for 
their transformation are instilled in the subjects 
by means of education (p. 82). 
Prior knowledge is also categorized as 
personal or cultural in terms of its source. If 
prior knowledge emerges exclusively on the 
basis of the specific, personal experiences of 
the individual who possesses it, it is considered 
personal. On the other hand, if it is formed by 
a multitude of phenomena shared by the 
wider society, or at least a community, it is 
deemed as cultural (Shore, 1996, pp. 56-65). 
Architectural types for instance are the 
cultural forms of this prior knowledge. 
 
2.2. Prior Knowledge and Cognitive Schemas 
in Design 
The cognitive literature states that prior 
knowledge is held by our minds by way of 
those specific cognitive structures that are 
called cognitive schemas. Described as the 
conceptual structures that stand for our 
knowledge of situations, events, objects and 
actions (Wertsch, 1985, p. 154), they are 
defined as the mental frameworks that we 
make use of in the organization of our 
knowledge. They are the conceptual 
structures that organize and direct our 
reception, storage, retrieval and production 
of information (D’Andrade, 1992, p. 28). 
Operating in long-term memory as organized 
structures of knowledge, they guide 
perception, enable comprehension and 
direct thinking. By schema theory, what the 
cognitive literature demonstrates us is the 
importance of our prior knowledge in the 
understanding of the forthcoming information 
and in the formation of new knowledge 
(Bruning, Schraw, Norby & Ronning, 2004, p. 6, 
22, 23). 
As the bearers of prior knowledge, cognitive 
schemas are also categorized as personal or 
cultural in terms of their source. Personal 
cognitive schemas are formed through 
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personal experiences and are specific to 
individuals. Cultural schemas, on the other 
hand, are attained through the individual’s 
relationship with the cultural context and are 
specifically defined as the “patterns of basic 
schemas that make up the meaning system of 
a cultural group” (Nisbett & Norenzayan, 2002, 
p. 5, 6). They are shared by the members of 
the society and they regulate their daily 
experiences and the interpretation of these 
experiences. As Holland & Quinn (1987) 
explain, they are the “presupposed, taken-for-
granted models of the world that are widely 
shared by the members of a society and that 
play an enormous role in their understanding 
of that world and their behavior in it” (p. 4). As 
situated cognition theory states, people carry 
their load of cultural information and operate 
them through their cognition by way of their 
cultural schemas, which exist as a subset 
within their bigger collection of cognitive 
schemas (Johnson, 1987, p. 19) (Oyserman, 
Sorensen, Reber & Chen, 2009, p. 219). 
Cognitive schemas are believed to 
encompass both the knowledge itself 
(declarative knowledge) and the information 
on the actual operationalization of that 
knowledge (procedural knowledge) (Chan, 
1990, p. 62). In this sense, as means to carry 
generic information, cognitive schemas 
provide the most efficient and most widely 
used type of information in the field of design. 
They contain information about objects, their 
constituents, and the relations between those 
constituents (Purcell & Gero, 1991, p. 83). 
Describing schemas in design as “the formal 
constructs for capturing, acquiring and 
representing types of knowledge structures in 
design”, Oxman (2004) argues that schemas 
constitute the essence of conceptual design 
knowledge, which, in turn, is structured around 
a number of conventions including typologies, 
rules, or precedents (p. 70). Looking for a 
relevant schema to organize our prior 
knowledge around in line with the cause at 
hand is considered as an essential part of the 
creative design process (Oxman, 1990). In this 
context, design creativity is seen as “the ability 
to innovatively re-represent the schema or the 
particular structural content of the 
externalized representation” (Oxman, 1996, p. 
333). 
Therefore, prior knowledge in architecture 
and design, attained through experience or 
education, is held by way of the cognitive 
schemas of the designer, in forms such as 
types, prototypes or precedents (Lawson, 
2004, p. 443). These schemas are used in the 
design process for recognizing the design 
situation, in the same way as the chess 
masters recognize the situation in a chess 
board by means of their experience. The 
recognition process accelerates and 
facilitates the design response, as it enables a 
quicker analysis compared to an in-depth 
analysis, and allows the designer to develop a 
solution by employing a standard gambit 
(Lawson, 2004, p. 448). The schemas are used 
as the ‘cognitive reference points’, which 
provide the first solution concepts that initiate 
the design (Goldschmidt, 1998; Jansson, 
Condoor & Brock, 1992). By providing the first 
solution concepts and supplying the gambits 
that are previously developed by the designer 
to solve similar problems, schemas hook up 
the design problem to its solution. The 
‘gambits’ that are utilized on the existing 
schemas, either to transform them or adapt 
them to the cause, are described as the 
‘repertoire of tricks’ or the applicable design 
strategies, which are used by the 
designer/architect to solve recognized 
problems. They are essentially the techniques 
used for the creation and transformation of 
forms, and designers often exhibit variance in 
terms of how they employ them (Lawson, 
2004, p. 448). 
Jansson et. al. (1992) defines three cognitive 
processes that are active in this process of 
using schemas (or prior knowledge) in 
architectural design: identification, where 
designers use types or prototypes for 
categorizing, understanding and representing 
design problems; synthesis, where they adapt 
or transform types or prototypes so as to fulfill 
the requirements associated with the 
problem; and evaluation, where they assess 
themselves with reference to those types or 
prototypes. These processes are believed to 
work in a consecutive and repetitive manner 
towards the realization of a complete 
architectural design (Jansson, Condoor & 
Brock, 1992). 
According to the literature, one needs a 
certain level of maturity to practice design 
well, as expertise in design is essentially a 
culmination of design knowledge and 
experience in the form of schemas. Lawson 
(2004) indicates that, the educational period 
of the designer helps him/her to develop a 
knowledge of design solutions, in the form of 
‘the pool of precedents’ or the ‘domain 
specific knowledge’ (p. 456). The designers 
who are considered experts are characterized 
                                                                           JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 3(3), 39-50/ 2019  
Dr. Zeynep Çiğdem UYSAL ÜREY          43      
by a vast pool of precedents and prior 
knowledge, which are stored as solution 
schemas to be employed at different design 
projects (Lawson, 2004, p. 456). For expert 
designers, the schemas of precedents or types 
do much more than just carrying the visual 
information and geometry. They also convey 
all the concepts related to that schema, 
including but not limited to the materials, 
functions, organization principles, and 
significant instances of that schema (Lawson, 
2004, p. 443). The schemas of expert designers 
are observed to be greater in number, in 
detail and in the extent of information that 
they hold (Purcell & Gero, 1991, p. 83). Lawson 
(2004) defines five stages, which the designer 
has to undergo in his/her journey to gain 
expertise in design: 
1. Formation of a developing pool of 
precedents 
2. Attainment of design schemas 
3. Development of certain guiding 
principles (e.g. sustainable design) 
4. Development of the skill of recognizing 
the design situation without the need 
of an in-depth analysis 
5. Formation of design gambits or a 
‘repertoire of tricks’ that are fused 
within the schemas used for 
recognizing the design situations 
(Lawson, 2004, p. 456-457) 
In this context, it is evident that the designers 
ought to examine a considerable amount of 
types and precedents in order to grow their 
load of schemas, which would enable them 
to “recognize underlying structures in design 
situations” and allow them to “employ and 
adapt gambits” that they acquired earlier 
(Lawson, 2004). 
 
3. Two Types of Domain Specific Prior 
Knowledge in Architectural Design: Types and 
Precedents 
According to Oxman (1992), the prior 
knowledge utilized in architectural design can 
be categorized into two groups: the types and 
the precedents. In this categorization, types 
and precedents are different from each other 
in terms of the form of reasoning that they 
demand from the designer: the former 
requires ‘refinement’ while the latter demands 
‘adaptation’. Employed as two distinct 
cognitive approaches to design, they are 
related with typological (model based) 
generic design and precedent-based (case-
based) adaptive design, respectively (Oxman, 
1992, p. 117). The section below will provide a 
glance at these two types of domain specific 
prior knowledge, so as to evaluate their role in 
architectural design. 
 
3.1. Types 
The formation of types, or the process of 
typification, is an outcome of the process of 
generalization or categorization. Oxman 
(1990b) describes typification as “the 
abstraction and classification of salient 
aspects of precedents in terms of both 
situations and solutions” (p. 17-28). One of the 
most evident applications of this process is 
formal typification, where classes of formal 
types are produced as based on certain 
known precedents. Typification also occurs in 
the perception of the design problem, where 
the designer tries to match the problem with a 
similar solution type that he/she previously 
encountered with. Regarding this process, 
Oxman (1990b) goes as far as claiming that 
“design knowledge is the knowledge of 
typification through abstraction” (p. 17-28): 
“We assume that all design 
experience undergoes 
processes of typification in 
order to create indices for the 
storage, and ultimately for the 
retrieval, of design episodes; 
and that the way in which this 
occurs is a function of the form 
of classification and existing 
structure of the designer's 
memory.” (Oxman, 1990, p. 
24) 
In this sense, typology operates as a form of 
indexing and categorization in design. Oxman 
(2001, 2004) describes typological knowledge 
as “a set of generic representations which are 
associated with specific problem types” 
(Oxman, 2001, p. 278) and defines types as 
the “conventionalized knowledge structures” 
(Oxman, 2004, p. 70) that occur as an 
important form of knowledge representation 
for the studies of design cognition. Types are 
considered as the characteristic forms of 
domain specific architectural knowledge that 
are attained by the designers through 
education and personal experience (Oxman, 
1996, p. 332). They contain a mass of prior 
knowledge allowing the designer “to extract 
generic schema from specific images” 
(Oxman, 2001, p. 280), and consist of both the 
‘generic representational schema’, as well as 
the knowledge of the strategies to employ 
when using this schema. In types, Oxman 
(1990a) sees the formalizations of a high level 
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of design knowledge encoded in generic 
forms, and does not refrain from calling them 
the general solution schemas, which act as 
the sources of generic knowledge to be 
manipulated in the process of design (Oxman, 
1990, pp. 2-8). 
In the light of the research on design 
cognition, architectural types could be seen 
as a part of our store of cultural schemas. 
Being the cultural attributes that are shared by 
a society, types behave like cultural schemas 
on the cognitive level, assisting both the 
interpretation of incoming architectural 
information and also the production of new 
designs (Oxman, 1990 pp. 2-8). Architectural 
theory refers to type both as an abstract 
conceptual form, as well as a cognitive 
facility, which provides the background for 
the systemic action of design that nestles 
essentially on categorization (Habraken, 1985, 
p. 40). As Moneo defines it, type could be 
seen in this sense as: 
“…the concept which 
describes a group of objects 
characterized by the same 
formal structure. It is neither a 
definite spatial diagram not 
the average of a serial list. It is 
fundamentally based on the 
possibility of grouping objects 
by certain inherent structural 
similarities. It might even be 
said that type means thinking 
in groups.” (Moneo, 1978, p. 
23) 
The elimination process that sort out only the 
common elements that belong to the group 
in question makes type “a schema and a 
collective product that is shared both by the 
architects and the community they serve to” 
(Petruccioli, 1998, p. 11). As Quatremere de 
Quincy’s definition also shows, type is “neither 
a concrete image of something that can be 
copied directly, nor it is a definite form, but it is 
a schema or the outline of a form, which acts 
as the abstract structure used for spatial 
articulation” (cited in Argan, 1996, p. 240, 
244). In this line of thought, architectural type 
can be understood as a ‘schema of spatial 
articulation’, which is shaped, if not 
formulated, as an answer to the ideological 
and practical needs of a society (Argan, 1996, 
p. 246). It functions as a non-linguistic cultural 
schema, associated with a specific society, 
and provides a visual image or a virtual model 
of a culture (Shore, 1996, pp. 56-65). It 
operates both in the interpretation of 
architectural products, as the preliminary 
schema of reference, and also in their 
production, as the purveyor of thought 
towards creative manipulations for new 
designs. 
According to Oxman (1990b), new designs 
could be built upon prior design knowledge 
and experiences, due to the fact that those 
experiences are abstracted, encoded and 
categorized in the form of types in long term 
memory. With their abstract and generic 
formation, types are capable of various new 
design solutions and in this process, analogical 
thinking stands out among other cognitive 
processes with the lead part that it plays 
(Oxman, 1990, p. 17-28). 
Cognitive schemas are used both for the 
representation of the typological knowledge 
that they carry in the mind, and for its 
processing for the purpose of coming up with 
a generic design (Oxman, 2001, p. 278). In 
Oxman’s jargon, the reasoning or processing 
style employed in the context of utilizing types 
in design is called as ‘refinement’. ‘Typological 
refinement’ basically refers to the distinctive 
thinking style employed in the formal 
processing of typological knowledge in 
design. The form of creativity emerging in this 
process on the other hand, is called as 
‘typological emergence’. Oxman duly 
provides an example of this notion with an 
illustration, showcasing type use in chair 
design, as part of the extended process of 
typological emergence (Fig. 2) (Oxman, 2001, 
p. 278). 
In refinement, the original state of a 
generalized (generic) schema, which is the 
architectural ‘type’, is successively 
transformed into a specific design through a 
top-down process. This underlying schema is 
called ‘generic’ due to the fact that it consists 
of only the most significant properties of the 
class of designs it belongs to and the type of 
design that refines this generic schema of 
type is called as the generic or the typological 
design (Oxman & Oxman, 1992, p. 119). 
Oxman accordingly developed a model that 
expresses the cognitive processing of generic 
or typological design, entailing the 
relationship between the design issue (the 
specification of the problem), design concept 
(the type of the solution) and design form (the 
end result). As shown by this model, the design 
process starts with deciding on a solution class 
(type), followed by developing the first form of 
generic representation of this class (level 1, 
which is basically the first modification of the 
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type), and finally culminating in the realization 
of the solution form (Fig. 3-5) (Oxman, 1994, 
pp. 141-146) (Oxman, 2001, p. 284). According 
to Oxman (1990b), in design, types could 
either be refined, by applying consecutive 
alterations over them to create new designs 
(appropriation), or could be adapted, by 
making greater formal or functional 
modifications over them to reach to new 
designs (analogy). Yet, a third alternative is 
also proposed to account for the cases where 
the existing types are not suitable for the 
situation and when completely new types are 
generated by, once again, using existing 
knowledge (innovation) (Oxman, 1990, pp. 17-
28). In this process, the design constraints 
function as the source of transformations, 
modifications or the generation. 
 
 
Figure 2. The process of the creative transformation of 
type through typological emergence. (Oxman, 2001, p. 
279) 
 
 
Figure 3. The steps of design thinking in generic or 
typological design (Oxman, 2001, p. 285) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The refinement of a generic schema (type) in 
design (typological design). (Oxman, 1992, p. 122) 
 
 
Figure 5. An example to the refinement process. (Oxman, 
1992, p. 123) 
 
3.2. Precedents 
The other significant type of domain specific 
knowledge available for the use of designers 
in new design contexts is the knowledge of 
design precedents (Oxman, 1996, p. 332). 
Within the context of creative design, 
designers evidently use cases or the 
knowledge of applicable prior designs to 
solve the recent problems they face with 
(Akin, 2002, p. 2). In their quest for new design 
ideas, designers look through numerous 
precedents to form applicable connections 
with the problem and this activity is often 
credited with enabling the appearance of 
new and previously unforeseen ideas for the 
designer (Oxman, 1994, p. 141, 142). 
Precedent is described as “the design case 
knowledge, which includes the particular 
conceptual contribution to design, which 
makes a case memorable as a precedent” 
(Oxman, 1994, pp. 141-142). To put it another 
way, precedents are the “specific designs or 
buildings, which are exemplary in some sense 
so that what architects and students glean 
from these examples, can support their own 
designs” (Akin, 2002, p. 3). In simpler terms, 
they are the earlier solutions to particular 
design problems. They are essentially different 
from types due to the fact that they are the 
specified design representations, instead of 
being the abstract schemas (Fig. 6) (Oxman, 
2001, p. 284). 
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Figure 6. Precedents, functional types, high level 
typological concepts. (Oxman, 1990b, p. 23) 
 
People are believed to benefit from 
precedents by mining the information they 
contain through analysis and abstraction. 
According to Akin, the conceptual 
abstractions acquired from precedents 
enable the designers to crossover the chasm 
between the conceptual and the physical 
design environment (Akin, 2002). This appears 
as the main reason behind the fact that 
solving problems in design requires not only 
the “problem solving skills and strategies” but 
also a large “body of knowledge”, which 
allow the application of these skills to specific 
problems (Akin, 2002). Precedents are found 
to be helpful in this sense due to the fact that 
they contain and display both the processes 
and the products of design within themselves. 
In this framework, it is not surprising to see that 
the studies on design education portray the 
knowledge of design precedents, and the 
concepts that are attained through them, as 
one of the most important sources of 
knowledge in design education (Oxman, 
2004, p. 71). 
Precedent knowledge is employed in design 
by means of ‘case-based reasoning’. This 
reasoning type essentially refers to the use 
and application of past experiences and 
examples for the understanding, analysis and 
solution of current problems. It is the process of 
choosing relevant ideas from prior problems 
for application to the current ones. According 
to Kolodner (1992), in case-based reasoning, 
the problem solver recalls a previous case that 
resembles the current one, or that is similar to it 
in certain aspects, and utilizes the solution to 
that past case to solve the case at hand (pp. 
3-4). In this process, the reasoner may go with 
adapting the old solutions to meet the 
demands of the new problems in order to 
solve them and this becomes the common 
practice of ‘problem solving type of case 
based reasoning’ as embraced by the 
designers. Or the reasoner may engage with 
the previous cases to explain, interpret and 
critique a current case, thus taking the route 
of ‘interpretive type of case-based reasoning’, 
as lawyers often do (Kolodner, 1992, pp. 3-4). 
‘Problem solving type of case based 
reasoning’ is employed very frequently in 
design. The process of choosing relevant ideas 
from prior designs, which can be applied 
effectively to the design problems at hand, is 
called as precedent-based (or case-based) 
design. What the precedents used in case-
based design do is to provide ‘a vocabulary 
of design ideas’ and the process that is used 
to transform these ideas to make them 
applicable to current cases is called as 
‘adaptation’ (Oxman, 2001, p. 284). 
According to Oxman (1996), adaptation is 
essentially the process of “fitting the old 
solution to a new one, or evolving a new 
design by modifying an existing solution 
representation” (p. 334). It involves the re-use 
of the prior representational content of an 
existing design solution after a thought out 
modification (Oxman, 1996, p. 334). The 
precedents, which are deemed to be stored 
in the form of cognitive schemas in the mind, 
are processed through adaptation for the 
formation of new design solutions (Fig. 9) 
(Oxman, 2001, pp. 269-295). 
As Kolodner (1992) suggests, case-based 
reasoning in design offers a complete solution 
for the design problem at hand and any 
pieces of the previous solution which do not fit 
the current problem can be adapted to it 
later. Although the amount of adaptation and 
the effort required to tailor the solution to the 
current problem might be substantial, and at 
times overwhelming, this method is almost 
always preferable to starting from scratch, 
which is often an intimidating task. It facilitates 
the design by enabling the designer to avoid 
numerous constraints and saving her from the 
need to compartmentalize the problem into 
multiple parts just to avoid the inherent 
difficulty of handling a larger problem 
(Kolodner, 1992, pp. 5-9). According to 
Kolodner (1992), case-based reasoning occurs 
in four steps (Fig. 8): 
1. The accumulation of precedents or 
experiences  
2. Remembering prior experiences that 
are similar to the current case at hand, 
and interpreting the new case in the 
light of these prior experiences through 
comparison 
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3. Adaptation of the prior experiences to 
“fix up an old solution to meet the 
demands of the new situation” 
4. Evaluation and repair of the outcomes 
 
Figure 7. Case-based reasoning cycle (Kolodner, 1992, p. 
22) 
 
4. Prior Knowledge in Design Education 
The studies on prior knowledge evidently 
affected the design education as well. In 
1969, Laxton (1969) developed a model for 
design education, which began by the 
accumulation of the reservoir of knowledge 
and experiences, followed by the 
development of the ability to develop ideas, 
and culminated by the acquisition of the skill 
of critically evaluating the developed ideas so 
as to interpret and transform them to meet the 
requirements of new contexts. He stated that 
design education at schools should entail, first 
and foremost, the domain specific knowledge 
of precedents, as the students cannot be 
realistically expected to be creative without 
accumulating a ‘reservoir of knowledge’ first, 
which would serve them as a pedestal on 
which to rise. According to Laxton (1969), the 
ability to develop new ideas is essentially 
contingent on this reservoir of knowledge to 
be filled well. In Lawson’s (2004) view, this 
model of design education was based 
principally on the development of prior 
knowledge and experience, rather than the 
generation of new ideas by way of a tabula 
rasa attitude, which was the dominant 
perspective towards the design education in 
the 20th century, valuing originality above all 
(p. 454). 
More recently, Akin called the method of 
education with a marked emphasis on the 
teaching of the precedents as “case-based 
instruction” (Akin, 2002). Based mostly on the 
analysis of precedents, this approach to 
education is expected to demonstrate the 
students the principles and strategies of 
architectural design by means of cases. The 
students are supposed to learn the design 
heuristics with the help of the precedents that 
they have examined. Even though this 
approach is criticized with the claim that it 
restricts the creative capacity of students, the 
literature offers no concrete evidence to 
prove the validity of this claim (Akin, 2002). 
By far, the studio based education is currently 
the most extensively employed method in 
schools of design. This method essentially tries 
to simulate the context of a professional 
design office and to replicate the actual 
phases of the design process, for instance the 
esquisse phase or the jury system, that are 
experienced in a design office (Oxman, 1999, 
pp. 105-106). This education offers an 
experience-based learning, where the student 
engages in design activity under the 
supervision of the instructor (Oxman, 2004, p. 
110). The students are not offered a didactic 
education focusing on abstract principles to 
be applied to problems, but an experiential 
one that depends on the hands on problem 
solving experience gained by dealing with 
specific design problems at hand (Akin, 2002, 
p. 2). 
According to Oxman, this system should be 
enhanced methodologically to enable the 
students to attain the domain knowledge of 
design, by means of cognitive schemas such 
as types or precedents, and the strategies of 
design thinking such as analogy, refinement or 
adaptation, which can then be used to 
manipulate these cognitive schemas to 
handle the specifics of the current problem 
(Oxman, 2004, p. 110): 
“It is our hypothesis that learning in 
design is the acquisition of the 
cognitive ability to manipulate the 
representations of design 
knowledge, to acquire basic 
schema in design thinking, to 
understand knowledge structures 
and to be able to manipulate 
characteristic strategies of design 
thinking such as generic and 
typological design, adaptive 
design, analogical thinking and 
creative exploration. That is, the 
cognitive attributes of design 
cognition and learning can 
become the content of design 
education.” (Oxman, 2004, p. 110) 
Under the guidance of several cognitive 
studies on design, Oxman identifies the 
necessary constituents that a design 
education should support the student with 
(Oxman, 2001, p. 280): 
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1. Cognitive structures: The attainment of 
the cognitive ability to represent 
design knowledge via basic schemas 
of design thinking, such as types and 
precedents, and, 
2. Cognitive strategies: The attainment of 
strategies, such as refinement or 
adaptation, to transform these basic 
schemas in order to produce original 
solutions. 
It becomes evident by this point that an 
effective design education should be based 
on an amalgamation of two distinct 
components: the domain knowledge (or 
vocabulary) of design that the students should 
learn by examining types and precedents; 
and the strategies to be employed in the 
design process that the students should 
develop by hands on design exercises 
(Oxman, 2004, p. 65). An educational 
approach capable of providing these two 
components is believed to bestow the student 
with the ability of the ‘designerly way of 
thinking’ (Cross, 2006). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The studies discussed so far demonstrate that 
the designers’ prior knowledge has a crucial 
impact in the initiation of the design process 
and in the production of new designs. 
Cognitive schemas that store this prior 
knowledge within our minds appear as the 
main actors in this process and they play a 
formative part both in the interpretation of 
incoming design information and also in the 
production of new ones. Through this 
schematic structure of our minds that is 
essentially based on learned information, we 
are intrinsically bound to our prior knowledge 
for the scope of our design ability. The 
comparative study of the literature on design 
cognition and architectural theory further 
demonstrates us that there is an effective 
correlation between cultural schemas and 
architectural types. It is observed that 
architectural types function identically as 
cultural schemas at the cognitive level, and 
types and precedents have a generative 
value for architectural design, by virtue of the 
fact that they exist as the initial cognitive 
schemas working at the start of the design 
activity. 
On these terms, studies on the cognitive use of 
prior knowledge in design provide a 
framework for us to conceive creativity 
differently by viewing culture from the lens of 
cultural-cognitive schemas, that of types and 
precedents. Suggesting that creativity in 
design essentially stems from familiar forms 
and methods of production, studies reject the 
idea that creativity is the ‘creation of 
something out of nothing’. On the contrary, 
they propose that creative production in 
design is about the production of something 
new through the refinement, adaptation, 
recombination and transformation of existing 
knowledge. Within this proposed perspective, 
the role of the familiar, the known and the 
existing, as embodied by types and 
precedents, occurs as important as the novel, 
the unknown, and the prospective, for the 
realization of creative design. 
 
Acknowledgement 
This work makes partial use of some of the 
theoretical discussions about the use of prior 
knowledge in architectural design in my PhD 
Dissertation (Uysal, Zeynep Çiğdem. (2012). 
Architectural Type as a Cultural Schema and 
Its Cognitive Use in Architectural Design: An 
Analysis of the Aga Khan Award Winning 
Dwellings in Turkey (1970-2008), Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, North Carolina State 
University, Raleigh. Supervisor: Prof. Kristen 
Schaffer) and on this account I would like to 
express my sincere gratitude once again to 
my advisor Prof. Kristen Schaffer and my 
committee members Prof. Paul Tesar, Prof. 
Meredith Davis, and Prof. Ronald Endicott. 
 
References 
Akin, O. (2002). Case-based instruction 
strategies in architecture. Design Studies. 
23. 407-431. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0142-
694X(01)00046-1 
Argan, G. C. (1996). On the typology of 
architecture. In K. Nesbitt (Ed.), Theorizing a 
New Agenda for Architecture: An 
Anthology of Architectural Theory 1965-
1995. New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press. https://www.amazon.com/Theorizing-
New-Agenda-Architecture-
Architectural/dp/156898054X 
Bonnardel, N., & Marmeche, E. (2005). Towards 
supporting evocation processes in creative 
design: A cognitive approach. International 
Journal of Human Computer Studies, 63, 
422-435. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.04.006 
Bruning, R. H., Schraw, G., Norby, M. & Ronning, 
R. (Eds.). (2004). Cognitive psychology and 
instruction. Columbus, Ohio: Pearson Merrill 
Prentice Hall. 
                                                                           JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 3(3), 39-50/ 2019  
Dr. Zeynep Çiğdem UYSAL ÜREY          49      
Chan, C. S. (1990). Cognitive processes in 
architectural design problem solving. 
Design Studies, 11(2), 60-80. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-694X(90)90021-
4 
Cross, N. (2001). Design cognition: Results from 
protocol and other empirical studies of 
design activity. In C. Eastman, W. 
Newstetter & M. McCracken (Eds.), Design 
knowing and learning: Cognition in design 
education. Oxford: Elsevier Books. 
https://www.elsevier.com/books/design-
knowing-and-learning-cognition-in-design-
education/eastman/978-0-08-043868-9 
Cross, N. (2006). Designerly ways of knowing. 
London: Springer-Verlag. 
https://www.springer.com/la/book/9781846
283000 
D’Andrade, R. (1992). Schemas and 
motivation. In R. D’andrade & C. Strauss 
(Eds.), Human motives and cultural models. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139166515.
003 
Goel, V. (2001). Dissociation of design 
knowledge. In C. Eastman, W. Newstetter & 
M. McCracken (Eds.), Design knowing and 
learning: Cognition in design education. 
Oxford: Elsevier Books. 
https://www.elsevier.com/books/design-
knowing-and-learning-cognition-in-design-
education/eastman/978-0-08-043868-9 
Goldschmidt, G. (1998). Creative architectural 
design: reference versus precedence. 
Journal of Architectural and Planning 
Research, 15(3), 258-270. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43030466 
Habraken, N. J. (1985). The appearance of the 
form: four essays on the position designing 
takes place between people and things. 
Cambridge, MA: Awater Press. 
https://www.amazon.com/Appearance-
Form-Position-Designing-Between-
ebook/dp/B00IOVOUQC 
Holland, D. & Quinn, N. (1987). Culture and 
cognition. In D. Holland & N. Quinn (Ed.s), 
Cultural models of language and thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
https://www.amazon.com/Cultural-
Language-Thought-Dorothy-
Holland/dp/0521311683 
Jansson, D. G., Condoor, S. S. & Brock, H. R. 
(1992). Cognition in design: viewing the 
hidden side of the design process. 
Environment and planning b: planning and 
design, 19, 257 – 271. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/b200257 
Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The 
bodily basis of meaning, imagination and 
reason. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/book
s/book/chicago/B/bo3613865.html 
Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. London: 
Penguin Books. 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Act-Creation-
Arthur-Koestler/dp/1939438985 
Kolodner, J. L. (1992). An introduction to case-
based reasoning. Artificial intelligence 
review 6, 3-34. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00155578 
Lawson, B. (2004). Schemata, gambits and 
precedent: some factors in design 
expertise. Design studies, 25(5), 443-457. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.destud.2004.05.001 
Laxton, M. (1969). Design education in 
practice. Attitudes in design education. 
London: Lund Humphries. 
Malhotra, A., Thomas, J. C., Carroll, J. M. & 
Millera, L. A. (1980). Cognitive processes in 
design. International journal of man-
machine studies, 12(2), 119-140. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0020-
7373(80)80013-7 
Mcdermott, J. (1982). Domain knowledge and 
the design process. Design studies, 3(1), 31-
36. https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-
694X(82)90077-1 
Nisbett, R. E. & Norenzayan, A. (2002). Culture 
and cognition. In D. L. Medin (Ed.), Stevens’ 
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, 
Third Edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/h
andle/2027.42/91934/culture_and_cognitio
n.pdf%3Bsequence=1 
Oxman, R. E. & Oxman, R. M. (1992). 
Refinement and adaptation in design 
cognition. Design studies, 13(2), 117–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-694X(92)90259-
D 
Oxman, R. E. (1990a). Design shells: A formalism 
for prototype refinement in knowledge-
based design systems. Artificial intelligence 
in engineering, 5(1), 2-8. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0954-1810(90)90030-
8 
Oxman, R. E. (1990b). Prior knowledge in 
design: a dynamic knowledge-based 
model of design and creativity. Design 
studies, 2(1), 17–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-694X(90)90011-
Z 
                                                                           JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 3(3), 39-50/ 2019  
Dr. Zeynep Çiğdem UYSAL ÜREY          50      
Oxman, R. E. (1992). Refinement and 
adaptation in design cognition. Design 
Studies. Vol. 13. No. 2. 
Oxman, R. E. (1994). Precedents in design: a 
computational model for the organization 
of precedent knowledge. Design studies, 
15(2), 141-157. https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-
694X(94)90021-3 
Oxman, R. E. (1996). Design by re-
representation: a model of visual reasoning 
in design. Design studies, 18(4), 329–347. 
https://www.academia.edu/5837938/Oxm
an_Rivka_1997_Design_by_re-
representation_a_model_of_visual_reasonin
g_in_design 
Oxman, R. E. (1999). Educating the designerly 
thinker. Design studies, 20(2), 105-122. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0142-
694X(98)00029-5 
Oxman, R. E. (2001). The mind in design: a 
conceptual framework for cognition in 
design education. In C. Eastman, W. 
Newstetter & M. McCracken (Eds.), Design 
knowing and learning: Cognition in design 
education, (pp. 269-295). Oxford: Elsevier 
Books. 
https://www.elsevier.com/books/design-
knowing-and-learning-cognition-in-design-
education/eastman/978-0-08-043868-9 
Oxman, R. E. (2004). Think-maps: teaching 
design thinking in design education. Design 
studies, 25(1), 63-91. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0142-
694X(03)00033-4 
Oyserman, D., Sorensen, N., Reber, R. & Chen, 
S. X. (2009). Connecting and separating 
mind-sets: culture as situated cognition. 
Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 97(2), 217–235. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015850 
Petruccioli, A. (1998). Typological process and 
design theory. MA: Aga Khan Program for 
Islamic Architecture. 
https://archnet.org/publications/4240 
Purcell, A. T. & Gero, J. (1991). The effects of 
examples on the results of design activity. In 
J. S. Gero (Ed.), Artificial intelligence in 
design aid. Oxford, UK: Butterworth-
Heinemann. https://doi.org/10.1016/0950-
7051(92)90026-C 
Shore, B. (1996). Culture in mind: cognition, 
culture and the problem of meaning. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://global.oup.com/academic/produc
t/culture-in-mind-
9780195095975?cc=tr&lang=en& 
Simon, H. A. (1973). The structure of ill-structured 
problems. Artificial intelligence, 4, 181–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(73)90011-
8 
Suwa, M., Purcell, T. & Gero, J. (1998). 
Macroscopic analysis of design processes 
based on a scheme for coding designers' 
cognitive actions. Design studies, 19(4), 455-
83. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0142-
694X(98)00016-7  
Uysal Ürey, Zeynep Çiğdem. (2019). The 
Sociocultural Role of Architectural Types: 
Cultural Sustainability in Architecture and 
the Possibility of Convention. GRID - 
Architecture, Planning and Design Journal, 
2 (1), 83-99. 
http://dergipark.org.tr/grid/issue/42546/491
782 
Uysal, Zeynep Çiğdem. (2012). Architectural 
Type as a Cultural Schema and Its 
Cognitive Use in Architectural Design: An 
Analysis of the Aga Khan Award Winning 
Dwellings in Turkey (1970-2008), Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, North Carolina State 
University, Raleigh. 
https://repository.lib.ncsu.edu/bitstream/ha
ndle/1840.16/7522/etd.pdf?sequence=2 
Wertsch, J. (Ed.). (1985). Culture, 
communication and cognition: 
Vyogotskian perspectives. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/6991064?q&v
ersionId=45241165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to Cite this Article: 
UYSAL ÜREY, Z.C. (2019). The Cognitive Use of Prior Knowledge 
in Design Cognition: The Role of Types and Precedents in 
Architectural Design. International Journal of Contemporary Urban 
Affairs, 3(3), 39-50. https://doi.org/10.25034/ijcua.2019.v3n3-4 
